



Totalitäre gewinnen, Demokraten zögern

100 Jahre nach armenischem Genozid und versuchtem jüdischen Genozid

Obwohl diese Woche Atomgespräche wieder anlaufen, steht ein Finalpakt mit Iran und den Mächten in Frage. Wenigstens erwachte Amerikas Opposition. Doch Iraner legen den [Pakt](#) vom 2. April [konträr](#) aus. Teheran kann weiter in Irak, Jemen und anderenorts expandieren. Staaten brechen Boykotte, darunter Russland, China und Nordkorea. Präsident [Obama](#) geht nicht offensiv globale Gegner an, den Restkommunismus und [Islamismus](#), beide totalitärer Art. Im Gegenteil, er lenkt ein wie gegenüber Kuba. Die Feinde sind aktiver, Demokraten verwirrt. Dies gab es schon vor 100 Jahren in [Mittelost](#) - totalitäre Ideologien griffen aus.



Foto: USAID [Wiki](#)



Foto: UK DFID [Wiki](#)



Karte: Augrabis [Wiki](#)

8. August [1914](#): Laut Obama Minorität der Yazidis vor Genozid durch sunnitischen „[Islamstaat](#)“ bewahren;
13. August [2014](#): Amerikaner des Analyseteams und Yazidis, Irak Berg Sinjar; Yazidi-Flüchtlinge in Syrien

Am 14. April überraschte viele die einmütige Annahme des durch Bob Corker formulierten Gesetzentwurfs [615](#) im Senatskomitee für Auswärtiges, wonach Präsident Obama ein jedes mit Iran abzuschließendes Abkommen dem Kongress zur Bewertung vorlegen muss. Das Parlament hat dann zwei Monate Zeit, den Finalpakt zu bejahen, zu verwerfen oder keine gemeinsame Resolution anzunehmen. Im letzteren Fall kann der Präsident nach seinem Ermessen handeln. Mithin ist sein Aktionsraum beschnitten worden und es wird vom Willen des Parlaments in jener Periode abhängen, was dann herauskommt. Den Kompromiss sah Barack H. Obama als hinreichend an, den Entwurf nach Abstimmung durch den Kongress anzunehmen und kein Veto einzulegen, dem ohnehin droht, noch überstimmt zu werden.


Fraglos schärfte die [Kongressrede](#) des israelischen Premiers Netanjahu das Bewusstsein der Parlamentarier im Umgang mit Teheran und der Natur des schiitischen [Islamstaats](#), der nach Nukes greift. Mitte des Vorjahrs lief die Rettungsaktion für Yazidis, denen durch den sunnitischen „[Islamstaat](#)“ ein Genozid drohte. Dies erhärtete am 19. März Hanny Megally von der Genfer UN. Der Bericht erhellte die Massentötung von „ungläubigen“ Männern, die Versklavung von Frauen und Mädchen sowie die Verbringung von Knaben. Zwar prüft der Deen Hager Internationale Strafgerichtshof eine Jurisdiktion für weitere Verbrechen von Jihadis in Irak und Syrien. Doch müsste dieser Auftrag von der UN kommen. Wie nun der schiitische Islamstaat zeigt, droht dieser wieder offen mit Genozid gegen Israels Juden. Indem die sechs Mächte dies nicht voll angehen, erlauben sie Iran, noch voranzukommen.

Am 15. April betonte Benjamin Netanjahu in Yad Vashem, 70 Jahre nach dem Holocaust, dass sich die Demokratien nicht blind gegenüber den tyrannischen Aspirationen Teherans zeigen dürfen. Aber genau das geschieht, indem nicht Irans Expansion, Raketenprogramm und Geheimaktionen erwogen werden. Treffen Medienberichte zu, so bekam Teheran aus Nordkorea zwei Schiffsladungen an Raketenteilen. Der Kreml entschied sich, Iran Raketen der Fliegerabwehr zu liefern. Russland und China wollen dort vier Nuklearreaktoren bauen. Damit ist die 5+1-Staatengruppe zerfallen. Am 17. April deutete [Obama](#) vor den Medien an, wohl Iran nachzugeben, das eine sofortige Aufhebung der Sanktionen beim Abschluss des Finalpakts verlangt (siehe widersprüchliche Factsheets Amerikas und Irans Seite 3-8).

Nicht minder versagt Kanzlerin Merkel in [Berlin](#). Sie folgt einfach nur Obama. Wie kann sie dies noch verantworten? [Papst](#) Franziskus las eine Gedenkmesse zum 100. Jahrestag des armenischen Genozids zum 24. April, „des ersten Genozids im 20. Jahrhundert“, dann kamen der Holocaust und Stalinismus. Auch heute erleben wir [Genozid](#) durch Schweigen, sagte er, und verwies auf Christen-Massaker und „den dritten [Weltkrieg](#) stückchenweise“.



Getötete Armenier [Wiki](#)



Auszug Morgenthau Kabel [Wiki](#)

Zionist Organization, ed.: *Palestine during the War*. Record of the Preservation of the Jewish Settlements in Palestine. From the Report to the 12th Zionist Congress at Carlsbad, September 1921. London 1921 [Italics added, names adapted], clippings pp. 18-42:

Baha ad-Din's great coup was the *expulsion* of Jews from Jaffa on December 17th, 1914. On that date at mid-day he suddenly issued an order that *all Jews* who were subjects of foreign Governments and had not yet become Ottoman subjects *must leave the country* by the boat which was to come to Jaffa at four o'clock... From the beginning of the war Cemal Pasha had been resolved to make Palestine Turkish... to send a large portion of the inhabitants... into distant... provinces, and to settle Turks in their place in Palestine... This was only a preliminary to the mass expulsion which he intended to order at the propitious moment. For the expulsion of the Jews, he chose the moment when in March, 1917, the British were preparing their first serious invasion of Palestine. On March 29th, the *order was issued that all Ottoman inhabitants not of the Moslem religion, and all Jews without distinction of nationality, must leave* their abodes in Jaffa and the colonies of the Jaffa Kaza. This order was generally interpreted as the prelude to a *repetition of the Armenian massacres*... rejoicings... by the news of the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, which reached Palestine while the advance of the English was taking place.



New York Times 18.8.15



New York Times 15.12.1915

US-Botschafter Henry I. Morgenthau am 16. Juli 1915: „Vernichtungspolitik unter Vorwand, eine Revolte niederzuschlagen“; New York Times 18. August, 15. Dezember 1915: „Anschuldigung, nach Plan eine ganze Bevölkerung auszulöschen“, „Massaker“, „absichtsvolle Vernichtungspolitik“, „1 Million Armenier tot oder exiliert“; Enver Pascha zu Gustav Stresemann am 1. Februar 1916: bis zu 1,5 Millionen Armenier getötet; Juden Palästinas im Palästina-Report 1921: Engländer eroberten Samaria und Galiläa so schnell, dass Osmanen keine Zeit mehr blieb, ihren Ausweisungsbefehl vom 29. März 1917 für alle Nichtmuslime und Juden umzusetzen. Befehl galt als Vorspiel der Wiederholung von „armenischen Massakern“ [an Palästinas Juden].

Vor [100](#) Jahren bewies der [Islamismus](#) in der deutsch-osmanischen Jihadisierung des Islam einen genozidalen Strang. Damals ging es um die absichtsvolle Vernichtungspolitik gegen „Ungläubige“ und Ethnien. Dann kam die Achse von Islamisten mit Nazis und Faschisten. Im Kalten Krieg globalisierte sich der Islamismus. In der Globalära deckt der transitorische Restkommunismus die Islamisten ab, die nach Atomwaffen greifen. [Wolfgang G. Schwanitz](#)

Dazu [Bücher](#) *Nazis, Islamists and the Making of the Modern Middle East*: [Yale](#), February 25, 2014, 360 pp. sowie *Islam in Europa, Revolten in Mittelost*: [Weist](#), 2013; 15. September 2014, 2. Aufl., [Berlin](#), [bestellbar](#).

American Factsheet
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
Regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's Nuclear Program

Lausanne, April 2, 2015 [Source](#): State Department Press Office

Below are the key parameters of a **Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)** regarding the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between the P5+1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.

&

Iranian Factsheet
"Factsheet" for Revision of Lausanne Statement

Tehran, April 15, 2015 [Source](#): Iranian Parliament's Nuclear Committee [FARS News Agency, [FNA](#)]

The factsheet which was presented by Head of the Nuclear Committee Ebrahim Karkhaneyee [on April 15] stresses the necessity for respecting the redlines and guidelines specified by Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei, making Iran's decisions and undertakings reversible to enable the country to resume its nuclear operations in case of the other side's non-commitment to its undertakings, and immediate termination of all sanctions in a single step and on the first day of the implementation of the final agreement.

The factsheet also necessitates commitment of both sides to their undertakings based on the Geneva agreement, a fair and reasonable balance between the gives and takes, taking good care not to impair the country's security and military boundaries and national interests, providing 190,000 SWUs (Separative Work Units) of nuclear fuel enrichment capability needed by Iran to produce fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant immediately after the end of contract with Russia, safeguarding the nuclear achievements, actual operation of all nuclear facilities of Iran not in words, but in action, continued Research and Development (R&D) works and scientific and technological progress in Iran and immediate application of R&D findings in the country's industrial-scale uranium enrichment cycle. **The factsheet urges operation of 10,000 centrifuge machines at Natanz and Fordo, a maximum 5-year-long duration for the deal and for Iran's nuclear limitations, replacement of the current centrifuges with the latest generation of home-made centrifuge machines at the end of the five-year period.**

Enrichment

American Factsheet

- Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s, Iran's first-generation centrifuge.
- Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
- Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
- All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
- Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15 years.
- Iran's breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one

weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework. Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium

- Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
- Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only – into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
- Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
- Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.

(2)

- Almost two-thirds of Fordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed. The remaining centrifuges will not enrich uranium. All centrifuges and related infrastructure will be placed under IAEA monitoring. Iran will only enrich uranium at the Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-1 first-generation centrifuges for ten years.
- Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-1 models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
- Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
- Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8 models to produce enriched uranium for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
- For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional Protocol resulting in certain limitations on enrichment capacity.

Iranian Factsheet (no page count)

Enrichment Program:

The period for the **Join Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)** should be limited to five years, in which about 10,000 active centrifuges operating at Natanz and Fordo now will continue nuclear fuel production by enriching uranium below the 5% grade.

The UF₆ enriched reserves which are under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be kept at Fordo nuclear plant and will be turned into nuclear fuel complex based on the existing capabilities.

During the five-year period, the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue to keep the excess centrifuges installed at Natanz and Fordo or will gradually dismantle them, and at the end of the 5-year period, it will replace all the existing centrifuges, including the active or inactive ones, with the new generation of (IR-N) centrifuge machines with the help of the new spaces and infrastructures which will have been already prepared and will use them without any limitation.

Justification:

Based on the Geneva agreement, the period for the final step should merely include a single period which has been considered as to be five years in the present factsheet. But in the Lausanne statement, different periods of 10, 20, 25 years and higher have been considered.

Given the Geneva agreement, the amount of enrichment should be specified based on the country's practical needs and the number of 10,000 centrifuges has also been specified on this basis.

The 5-year period in this factsheet has been specified with respect to the date when Iran's nuclear fuel contract with Russia for the Bushehr nuclear power plant will end; hence, the rules and limitations for the components of the enrichment cycle should be set in such a way that the Islamic Republic of Iran will be able to supply the fuel needed for the power plant after the end of the contract with Russia.

Operation of 10,000 centrifuges and developing and having a 10-ton enriched uranium stockpile will enable the Islamic Republic of Iran to supply the fuel needed for the Bushehr power plant in the year when the fuel supply contract with Russia (28-30 tons) ends.

Fordo installations:

Fordo nuclear facility will remain an enrichment and nuclear Research and Development (R&D) center. 4 enrichment cascades with 656 centrifuges will continue operation and production of fuel for purity levels lower than 5% by maintaining the current chain arrangements.

If the country would need 20%-degree (enriched) uranium, the nuclear fuel production line for purity levels lower than 5% will be altered to enrich uranium to the 20%-grade after connecting the centrifuge cascades to each other again.

Justification:

Based on the above, Fordo will remain an actual and active center, and the Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain its capability to reverse its decision and restore the 20%-grade enrichment.

American Factsheet

Inspections and Transparency

- The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran's nuclear facilities, including to Iran's enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
- Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran's nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
- Inspectors will have access to uranium mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
- Inspectors will have continuous surveillance of Iran's centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran's centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
- All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
- A dedicated procurement channel for Iran's nuclear program will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuclear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.

(3)

- Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran's nuclear program, including both declared and undeclared facilities.
- Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
- Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
- Iran will implement an agreed set of measures to address the IAEA's concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.

American Factsheet

Reactors and Reprocessing

- Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
- The original core of the reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities of weapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
- Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor's lifetime.
- Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
- Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will sell any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
- Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.

Iranian Factsheet

Research and Development (R&D):

In a bid to use R&D findings in the country's industrial-scale enrichment chain, R&D should be planned in a way that the necessary possibilities and infrastructures will be provided for replacing the first generation of centrifuges with the latest generation of centrifuge machines (IR-N) when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action comes to an end after 5 years.

The R&D program should undergo no limitation before it comes into use for industrial-scale operation.

Justification:

Accordingly, the advanced centrifuges will enter the chain of nuclear fuel production without any restriction at the end of the 5-year deal.

Arak Heavy Water Reactor:

Given the Group 5+1 countries' mere concern about the plutonium existing in the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) of the Arak 40-MW heavy water reactor, the fuel used by the reactor will be sent abroad.

The G5+1 states will be committed to cooperate and take the necessary measures for relevant international licensing and permissions.

Justification:

Given the SNF export abroad, the insistence of the G5+1, specially the US, on redesigning the said reactor is merely a pretext and doesn't have any scientific rationale.

What is more important than the heavy water nature of Arak reactor is the core of the reactor which is due to be taken out and then be redesigned and renovated. Such a move is irreversible in nature, and thus means crossing the specified redlines.

American Factsheet

Sanctions

- Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments.
- U.S. and E.U. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.

(4)

- The architecture of U.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant non-performance.

- All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, of nuclear-related actions addressing all key concerns (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
- However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
- A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to seek to resolve disagreements about the performance of JCPOA commitments.
- If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
- U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will remain in place under the deal.

Iranian Factsheet

Supervision and Inspection:

Supervision and inspections of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program should be carried out within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) safeguards agreements.

Justification:

Once done, the principle stated by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution - that security and military sanctities and boundaries shouldn't be violated and that the inspections should be carried out at conventional levels similar to all other countries - will be respected and materialized. Given the Islamic Republic of Iran's opposition to the world arrogance, endorsing and implementing the Additional Protocol will provide the world arrogance (a term normally used for the US and its western allies) with legal grounds to stage their preplanned plots against the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Sanctions:

Concurrently with the start of the JCPOA, all the US and EU sanctions will be terminated and Iran will start fulfilling its undertakings based on the verification of the IAEA.

The UN Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran will be annulled and all nuclear-related sanctions will be terminated and the Islamic Republic of Iran's case will be normalized.

The G5+1 countries, the EU and the UNSC will avoid imposition of new nuclear-related sanctions against Iran.

Justification:

By terminating all sanctions in a single step right at the start of the implementation of the final comprehensive agreement, the Supreme Leader's statement that termination of sanctions is part of the agreement and not its result will be materialized.

Based on the Geneva agreement, after the implementation of the JCPOA, all UNSC, US and EU sanctions should be terminated and no new (UNSC) resolution would be needed in this regard; Hence, terminating the UNSC sanctions will close the case and no new resolution which would pave the ground for new plots will be issued.

International cooperation:

The Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear cooperation with the world states, including the G5+1 members, in areas of building nuclear power plants, research reactors, nuclear fuel production, nuclear safety medicine and nuclear agriculture, etc. will be possible and will improve. Based on the JCPOA, Iran will be provided with access to the global market, trade and finance and technical know-how and energy.

Reversibility:

In case of the two sides' non-commitment to their undertakings, there will be a possibility for reversing all measures.

Justification:

Based on the aforementioned proposal, the Islamic Republic of Iran will be provided with reversible measures at the lowest level of damage and, therefore, the G5+1's commitment to its undertakings will be in fair balance (with those of Iran).

Duration of the JCPOA:

After the end of the five-year period and the JCPOA exercise, all restrictions will be lifted and based on the Geneva agreement, the case with the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear program will be similar to that of the other NPT member states.

American Factsheet

Phasing

- For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development – ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the P5+1.
- For fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. For instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
- Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran's adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significant access and transparency obligations. The robust inspections of Iran's uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
- Even after the period of the most stringent limitations on Iran's nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran's development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.

###

Iranian Factsheet

The Iranian Parliament factsheet for a revision to the Lausanne agreement came after the US released a factsheet different from the joint statement issued by Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif and Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and head of the G5+1 in nuclear talks with Iran, at the end of the latest round of Iran-world powers nuclear talks in Switzerland on April 2, known as the Lausanne statement.

The US factsheet that was released only a few hours after the Lausanne framework understanding caused fury in Iran, encouraging many to raise deep doubt about the results of the talks and US accountability and trustworthiness.

In only a few weeks, a bipartisan bill was also presented to the Congress for vote that would give the US legislature oversight of a final deal, a move seen by many across the globe, including both Iran and the US, as furthering impediments to the endorsement of a final deal between Iran and the sextet.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Bob Corker, who wrote the bill, said the White House had agreed to go along with the bill only after it was clear there was strong Democratic support. The legislation was passed unanimously by the committee and is expected to pass the full Senate and then the House of Representatives.

"That change occurred only when they saw how many senators were going to vote for this," Corker said.

###